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AN AGENCY COST ANALYSIS OF THE
WRONGFUL TRADING PROVISIONS:
REDISTRIBUTION, PERVERSE INCENTIVES AND
THE CREDITORS' BARGAIN
RIZWAAN J. MOKAL*
I. INTRODUCTION
THE law of corporate insolvency is coercive, and that coercion
needs to be justi®ed. When a ®rm is solvent, the law is happy
enough to allow individual creditors to pursue their own strategies
in recovering what is owed to them. An unsecured creditor is free
to obtain a judgment against the ®rm and to enforce it, without
having to worry about the rest of the debtor ®rm's aairs. The
secured creditor can, in appropriate circumstances, seek possession
of the collateral. All the parties are left to do what they consider to
be in their own best interest, and claims are satis®ed (roughly) in
the order in which they are brought.
But once it appears the ®rm is no longer able to pay its debts as
they become due,
1 the situation changes. While secured creditors
are in general still free to pursue individual remedies,
2 numerous
constraints are imposed on general creditors. Attempts to extract
individual advantage are liable to be struck down if the debtor is
motivated by the desire to prefer the particular creditor over
others.
3 And once the ®rm goes into the formal liquidation
procedure, all unsecured creditors are bound. A winding-up order
operates in favour of all those with interests in the company's
undertaking,
4 and the dedicated insolvency forum enjoys a
monopoly over the collection of the debtor's assets and disposal of
* Barrister, Faculty of Laws, University College London. I am very grateful to Alison Clarke for
her helpful comments. Thanks are also due to Taimur Hyat for giving me his views on an
early draft of this paper. Any remaining mistakes are of course my own.
1 Insolvency Act 1986 (hereafter, IA), s. 123.
2 The question whether this is commensurate with the aims of insolvency law is seldom asked in
this jurisdiction. When asked, it is shrugged aside with the observation that security holders
are merely seeking access to what in fact belongs to them. See e.g. James L.J. in Re David
Lloyd & Co. (1887) 6 Ch.D. 339, 344±345. But as more thoughtful commentators have pointed
out, this answer is far from satisfactory. See e.g.. Clarke, ``Security interests as property:
relocating security interests within the property framework'', in Harris (ed.), Property Problems
from Genes to Pension Funds (London, 1997).
3 IA, s. 239; see Re MC Bacon [1990] B.C.L.C. 325, per Millett J. (as he then was).
4 IA, s. 130(4).
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unsecured claims against it.
5 So, why should the law restrict
creditors' freedom of action when their debtor becomes insolvent?
It is current orthodoxy that one of the main reasons insolvency
law exists is to maximise the pool of assets available to all the
company's creditors.
6 As the company approaches insolvency, the
existence of multiple claims leads to a type of Prisoner's Dilemma:
many self-interested and rational individual actors pursuing
identical ends in ignorance of each other's activities. When the ®rm
is insolvent, it is unlikely to have enough assets to pay o all its
creditors, almost as a matter of de®nition. So in the absence of a
collective and mandatory insolvency procedure, the earlier each
creditor can put in his claim, the greater the likelihood of him
being paid in full (or at all). Such individual action is aggressive
and wasteful, imposing costs on all the actors viewed collectively.
7
Insolvency law steps in to enforce a single compulsory procedure
for the proof of debts. The race no longer goes to the swiftest. The
debtor's business need not be broken up and sold piecemeal, for
example, to satisfy individual creditors as and when they make
their claims. Rather, a more socially ecient decision might be
made, based perhaps on the disposal of the business as a going
concern, which might bring better returns. Secured creditors already
having taken the ®rst bite, the residue can be distributed pari passu
(like claims to be treated alike) among all the unsecured creditors.
Insolvency law is paternalistic, then, curtailing the creditors'
freedom of action in their own collective best interest.
The theoretical justi®cation is said to lie in the notional bargain
rational self-interested creditors would strike ex ante about the
treatment of their claims in case their debtor becomes insolvent.
8 If
all those who would eventually line up to prove in the company's
winding-up could come together before anyone had lent anything,
runs the argument, they would accept a curtailment of their
individual rights, should insolvency occur. They would accept the
need to preserve going concern value, and would bargain to restrict
their ability to undertake independent aggressive action, so long as
5 IA, ss. 127, 128, 130(2).
6 Commentators accept that it might have other goals as well, for example, attempting to rescue
the ®rm, and to penalise the management for acts or omissions harmful to the company and
its creditors. See, e.g., Finch, ``The measures of insolvency law'' (1997) 17 O.J.L.S. 227 for an
overview of dierent visions of insolvency law, and Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency
Law (London, 1997), 25±29.
7 As to the nature of these costs, see below.
8 The locus classicus is Jackson, ``Bankruptcy, nonbankruptcy entitlements, and the creditors'
bargain'', (1982) 91 Yale L.J. 857. See also, by the same author, The Logic and Limits of
Bankruptcy Law (London, 1986); Baird and Jackson, Cases, Problems and Materials on
Bankruptcy (Boston, 1985); Baird and Jackson, ``Corporate reorganizations and the treatment
of diverse ownership interests'' (1984) 51 Univ. Chicago L.R. 97.
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all other creditors with similar claims would also be under identical
constraints.
9
The hypothetical creditors' bargain, then, justi®es the coercion
inherent in corporate insolvency law by appealing to the virtue of
autonomy. Creditors themselves would freely accept limits on their
freedom of action in the debtor ®rm's insolvency if they could
come together ex ante to enter into an agreement binding on all.
10
The law merely steps in to provide an o-the-shelf system, and the
parties no longer have to waste resources in identifying each other
and coming up with a new agreement for each transaction.
The creditors' bargain justi®cation of insolvency law is of course
not cost free. If the coercive insolvency rules are best viewed as a
re¯ection of the hypothetical ex ante agreement, then the coercion
must necessarily be limited to what would be regarded by the
parties themselves as acceptable at the negotiation stage. Further,
the collective nature of the mandatory forum entails the existence of
special rules for the proof of debts and the distribution of the
insolvent's assets. Given that the hypothetical bargain would be
concluded to overcome the common pool problem mentioned
above, it has been argued that special insolvency rules should not
disturb the relative value of parties' pre-insolvency rights.
11 Not
only would such a redistributionÐbeing unrelated to the solution of
any common pool problemÐnot form any part of the hypothetical
bargain, it would also create perverse incentives. For example, the
parties in whose favour insolvency rules redistribute would have an
incentive to rush the company into the dedicated insolvency forum
to take advantage of those rules, even if the debtor ®rm's business
is viable and it could be brought back to pro®table trading if given
the chance. So while the mandatory forum exists to counter the
adverse eects of sel®sh individual behaviour, any redistribution of
rights would in fact end up encouraging parties sel®shly to invoke
the special (redistributive) rules in a way detrimental to the
collective interests of all the parties aected.
12
Opponents of redistribution point out that having in the
insolvency forum an alternative method of vindicating claims
13 is
9 Jackson, Bankruptcy, 16.
10 Note that involuntary creditors, e.g. victims of torts committed directly or vicariously by the
insolvent, have little say in the voluntary ex ante bargain. Still, even they would presumably
agree to an arrangement which maximised the value of the ®rm for all the claimants; see
below.
11 One way that the relative value of pre-insolvency rights could be upset would be for the
special insolvency law regime to create rights in some parties which did not exist under the
general law; see Jackson, Bankruptcy, 22 and 93. But Jackson also cautions, in the ®rst
sentence of chapter 3 of Bankruptcy, 68, that ``Bankruptcy law ... should focus primarily on
values, not rights.''
12 Jackson, Bankruptcy, 21.
13 In addition to non-insolvency debt-collection mechanisms.
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expensive, and this expense must be justi®ed by having reference to
the reason for which that additional method exists. That reason is
to be found, via the notional creditors' bargain, in the need to
preserve the going concern and to minimise transaction costs.
14
That reason is undermined if insolvency law creates new rights
which do not exist under the general (non-insolvency) law. The only
way to avoid this result seems clear: ``[I]n its role as a collective
debt-collection device, bankruptcy law should not create rights.
Instead, it should act to ensure that the rights that exist are
vindicated to the extent possible. Only in this way can bankruptcy
law minimize the conversion costs of transferring an insolvent
debtor's assets to its creditors.''
15
This, then, is the basic argument against insolvency law carrying
out any redistribution, and the discussion also ¯eshes out the
notion of redistribution. In this context, a rule of insolvency law is
redistributive if it confers a right on a group of claimants which
they would not have as a matter of non-insolvency law. Crucial, for
the purposes of this paper, is the question how to determine what
is available to the insolvent's creditors. In answering it, the proper
perspective is said to be that of ``an unsecured creditor attempting
to execute on a particular asset or to assert a security interest in
it''.
16 If the general law denies him access to something, insolvency
law should promise him no more: ``If unsecured creditors cannot
execute against an asset as a matter of nonbankruptcy law, then
that property has no value to them and should not be considered
to be ... property of the [insolvent ®rm's] estate.''
17
This article uses the wrongful trading provisions of the
Insolvency Act 1986
18 to argue that parties bargaining ex ante
would in fact agree to a change in the relative values of their
claims at the time of the company's insolvency. So a form of the
notional bargain, extended to include not just creditors but also
shareholders and managers could itself provide forÐand therefore
justifyÐsome types of insolvency redistribution.
19 It is also argued
here that far from creating perverse incentives, some types of
redistribution might actually have eects conducive to the common
good.
20 It is to be noted that both these propositions contradict the
14 See above.
15 Jackson, Bankruptcy, 22; see also, Baird, ``Loss distribution, forum shopping, and bankruptcy''
(1987) 54 Univ. Chicago L.R. 815, 825±826.
16 Jackson, Bankruptcy, 93.
17 Ibid.
18 Section 214.
19 See Section III, below.
20 See Section V, below.
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views of most law and economics theorists writing on insolvency
issues.
21
A word about terminology. The terms ``manager'' and ``director''
are used interchangeably in this paper to refer to the top decision-
makers in the ®rm's hierarchy. It has rightly been noted that
``[d]irectors, despite what company articles say, do not manage
listed companies. Instead, the board, in accordance with the articles
of association, delegates its managerial powers to full time
executives''.
22 A couple of points should be noted here as relevant
to the argument which follows. First, whatever the case with listed
companies, the analysis below suggests the section 214 duty is most
relevant to companies whose directors themselves own a substantial
chunk of the ®rm's equity. In such companies, there is unlikely to
be any clear-cut distinction between directors who sit on the board,
and managers who are entrusted in reality with the day to day
running of the business. Further, even when a director has
justi®ably delegated some of his managerial functions, he retains a
residual duty of supervision and control, and has a continuing
obligation, individually and along with the rest of the board, to
maintain a sucient knowledge and understanding of the
company's business.
23 A failure on his part to do so will cause him
to be liable for any wrongful trading which might take place.
24
Finally, in a ®rm where there is a clear distinction between
directors and lower-level managers, if the directors ``delegate'' their
decision-making powers to a manager to such an extent that they
could be regarded as being accustomed to act in accordance with
the latter's instructions, then the latter renders himself a shadow
director,
25 and thereafter is directly subject to the strictures of the
wrongful trading provisions.
26
II. ARE THE WRONGFULTRADING PROVISIONS REDISTRIBUTIVE?
Section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 arose out of frustration at
the perceived failure of the rules against fraudulent trading. The
Cork Committee reported
27 that the existing law did not provide
sucient incentives to directors of insolvent companies to take
21 To take a speci®c example, Chens, Company Law (Oxford, 1997), 537±548, argues that a
section 214-type duty would not be oered and accepted by the interested parties in a
hypothetical bargain.
22 Chens, 603±604.
23 See e.g. Re Barings plc and others (No. 5); Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Baker
and others (No. 5) [1999] 1 B.C.L.C. 433.
24 IA, s. 214(5); see e.g. Re Brian D Pierson (Contractors) Ltd. [1999] B.C.C. 26.
25 IA, s. 251.
26 As to shadows, see Section IV, below.
27 Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd 8558, 1982), hereafter,
the Cork Report, ch. 44.
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steps to prevent further loss to their company's creditors. Not only
was the drafting of the rules infelicitous,
28 but the requirement to
show dishonesty on part of the debtor's managers to the criminal
standard proved unduly onerous.
29 The Cork Committee
recommended that any person involved with the management of
the company be made personally liable for the company's debts if
he allowed such debts to be incurred, there being no reasonable
prospect of repaying them. The directors would be under a duty to
place their company under receivership, administration or
liquidation if at any time they considered it to be insolvent, on pain
of being liable for wrongful trading. A claim for wrongful trading
would be available to the company's creditors or members, its
liquidator, administrator or receiver, if the company was in a
formal insolvency proceeding (administration, receivership or
liquidation).
30
These strong proposals were watered down by the Department
of Trade and Industry
31 before being enacted as what is now
section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986.
32 The action is available
only to the liquidator when the company is in insolvent liquidation,
and only directors
33 can be made subject to it. If, at some time
before the commencement of the company's winding up, a director
knew or ought to have concluded that there was no ``reasonable
prospect'' of avoiding insolvent liquidation, he would be liable for
wrongful trading,
34 unless from then on, he took ``every step'' he
ought to have taken to minimise loss to the company's creditors.
The standard by which he is to be judged is de®ned by reference
both to his actual knowledge, skill and experience, and to the
expertise reasonably to be expected of a person carrying out the
same functions as him in relation to the company.
To determine whether section 214 is redistributive, a comparison
must be made between the positions of the bene®ciaries of these
provisions before and after the debtor ®rm becomes subject to the
distinct insolvency regime. The provisions are redistributive if they
28 See Oditah, ``Wrongful Trading'' [1990] L.M.C.L.Q. 205, 206.
29 Ibid.; see Re Patrick & Lyon Ltd. [1933] Ch. 786. But as Prentice points out, the courts shifted
their position after the publication of the Cork Report, rejecting the so-called ``sunshine
doctrine'' and making it somewhat easier to prove fraud; see ``Creditor's interests and
director's duties'' (1990) 10 O.J.L.S. 265, 265 fn. 5.
30 Cork Report, paras. 1781±1806.
31 A Revised Framework for Insolvency Law (Cmnd 9175, 1984).
32 This weakening of the proposals has been criticised; see, e.g., Williams and McGee, ``Curbing
un®t directors'', Insolvency Lawyer, Feb 1993, 5.
33 Including shadow directors; see IA, s. 251.
34 The term appears, not in the section itself, but only in the marginal notes. It is in this
potentially signi®cant way that the section is wider than Cork's proposals; the debtor need not
be trading for its directors to be rendered liable under section 214.
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give to those whose interests they serve a claim against assets they
would not have under the general law.
35
It is clear, after the Court of Appeal's judgment in Re Oasis
Merchandising Services Ltd.,
36 that it is the ®rm's general body of
creditors together which stands to bene®t from any recoveries under
section 214. The reasoning which led to this conclusion is very
relevant. In this case, the liquidator had purported to assign the
fruits of a section 214 action to a specialist litigation support
company, the assignees promising in return to fund the action. This
was challenged. It was common ground that the agreement was
champertous, and the dispute centred around whether the power
conferred on the insolvent company's liquidator
37 ``to sell any of
the company's property'' applied to validate it.
38 The Court held
that it did not, since a distinction was to be drawn:
between assets which are the property of the company at the
time of the commencement of the liquidation ... including
rights of action which arose and might have been pursued by
the company itself prior to the liquidation, and assets which
only arise after the liquidation of the company and are
recoverable only by the liquidator pursuant to statutory powers
conferred on him.
39
Only the former category of asset was covered by the statutory
exception. But recoveries under section 214 fell within the latter
category. Not only was it the case that the assets recovered as a
result of a successful section 214 action did not form part of the
debtor's estate at the point where the special insolvency regime
took over. In fact, the very right of action under section 214 did
not exist till that moment. The company never itself had that right
while solvent (and governed by the general law). This explains why
it could not have created a charge over any recoveries.
40 It followed
that anything squeezed out of directors would go to augment the
pool of assets available for distribution to preferential and
unsecured creditors. That did not mean of course that any of the
company's creditors could have proceeded directly against the
company's directors at any time. The right of action created by
section 214 inhered exclusively in the liquidator, arising only under
the rules creating the distinct insolvency forum. The Court of
Appeal highlighted the contrast by noting that recoveries under
section 212 of the Insolvency Act 1986 for misfeasance in the
35 See text accompanying fns. 15±17, above.
36 [1998] Ch. 170; pet diss [1997] 1 W.L.R. 1197 (HL).
37 By IA, Sch. 4, para. 6.
38 Re Oasis, above, 177H.
39 Ibid., 181D.
40 Ibid., 181G.
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company's aairs could be charged by debenture, since the section
provided a summary method of vindicating rights available to the
company before the winding up.
41 It is clear, then, that under
section 214, the insolvent ®rm's general creditors are being given
bene®t of a right, held and exercised in their favour by the
liquidator, which does not exist under non-insolvency law, and they
gain access under that right to the personal assets of the debtor
company's directors, which assets were immune to their claims
before the debtor entered the special insolvency forum.
That is not quite the end of the matter. As pointed out above,
section 214 creates a duty on directors, once there remains no
reasonable prospect their company would avoid insolvent
liquidation, to take steps to minimise loss to the company's
creditors. The duty could be owed either to the insolvent company
itself, or it could be owed to the creditors and mediated through
the company. In either case, the question arises whether this duty,
though nominally a new one available for vindication only once the
company is in insolvent liquidation, is merely a recast of a duty
under general non-insolvency law owed by the directors to the
company itself, or to its shareholders. If that were the case, then
section 214 would not be substantively redistributive.
The argument might look something like this. It is trite law that
the directors of a healthy company are under a duty to protect and
uphold the interests of the company, and that of course includes
having regard to the interests of the company's shareholders. The
general law imposes obligations on directors to manage the
company's aairs in the interests of shareholders as a whole.
42 The
directors are required to protect the collective interests of both
current and prospective shareholders and to this end they must
positively direct their eorts.
43 But ``[the directors'] loyalty needs to
change when there is a change in the residual owner, the person
who gains or loses from any change in the fortune of the ®rm.''
44
Now when insolvency threatens, legal doctrine recognises that the
company's creditors replace its shareholders as the ``owners'' of the
company, and therefore, it is to them, via the company, that
directors' duties are owed.
45
41 Ibid., 181F.
42 Piercy v. S Mills & Co. [1920] Ch. 77; Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd. [1967] Ch. 254. The statement
in the text must be quali®ed; section 309 of the Companies Act 1985 imposes a subsidiary
obligation on directors to have regard to the interests of the company's employees.
43 For examples, see Rackham v. Peek Foods Ltd. [1990] B.C.L.C. 895.
44 Baird, ``The initiation problem in bankruptcy'' (1991) 11 International Review of Law and
Economics 223, 228±229.
45 Kinsela v. Russell Kinsela Property Ltd. (in liq.) (1986) 4 N.S.W.L.R. 722, 730, per Street C.J.;
quoted with approval by Dillon L.J. in West Mercia Safetywear Ltd. (in liq.) v. Dodd and
another [1988] B.C.L.C. 250, 252±253.
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It might therefore be argued that section 214 merely recon®rms
the switch of loyalty required of the directors of a troubled
company, crystallising the content of the duty. The obligation to
act in the collective interest of the shareholders metamorphoses into
a duty to take every step to minimise harm to the company's
creditors as a group. The directors pay from their own pocket for
loss done in breach of the ®duciary obligations imposed by the
general law to shareholders via the company, and they pay similarly
for breach of the duty to creditors imposed by section 214. The
latter provision is not redistributive since it imposes no new
obligations, and makes available nothing not already at risk. All
this section does is to con®rm the change in identity of the
recipients of the bene®t of directors' duties.
46
This argument is super®cially attractive but ultimately
unpersuasive. First, it is dicult to reconcile with the Court of
Appeal's decision in Re Oasis,
47 and the clear distinction drawn
between the vindication of a pre-existing right under section 212,
the fruits of which are capable of being charged by the company,
and the creation of a wholly new cause of action which does not
exist till the company enters insolvent liquidation, and which
therefore the company can not deal with at all.
48
But second, it is dicult to see the duty imposed by section 214
as analogous or equivalent to any duty which could exist outside of
insolvency. Remember that the section imposes what could be
called terminal obligations. These arise only when there are no
reasonable prospects of the company avoiding insolvent liquidation,
and they disappear into the ether if perchance the company does
recover. The very background against which they operate is that of
the company having died while incapable of satisfying all
outstanding debts. Most of the deceased's creditors would have to
suer some loss. It is in this context that the directors are required
to take every step they ought to take to minimise this loss. In
many, if not most cases, this would eectively require the directors
to relinquish control, either by asking a court for an administration
or winding-up order, or by inviting a secured creditor to appoint a
receiver.
49 It is obvious this would seldom be appropriate (or even
possible) while the company is solvent.
In any case, directors of healthy companies are not always
concerned to maximise the gains in the short run, and valid
strategies might entail a levelling of returns on the company's
46 Oditah considers a similar argument in ``Wrongful trading'' [1990] L.M.C.L.Q. 205, 217±218.
47 [1998] Ch. 170, above.
48 See also Re Howard Holdings Inc. [1998] B.C.C. 549, 554G.
49 See e.g. Framework, above, para. 12; Goode, Insolvency, 472±473.
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investments or even some losses while it battles for market share, say:
So long, at least, as the company seems likely to continue as
an independent entity, there would seem to be no reason in
principle why the directors, in adopting their business policies,
should be required by law to favour those shareholders who
wish to sell their shares now or in the short term, as against
those who see themselves as long-term holders.
50
Under section 214, on the other hand, the only concern would
generally be with short-term performance, the only aim would be to
increase the immediate value of the company's assets or to halt a
fall in that value, and all decisions would be judged with reference
to that. The contrast could hardly be greater. The point is not only
that the obligations imposed by section 214 exist only in insolvency,
but that, because of their terminal nature, they are incapable of
existing except when the company is on its deathbed. It can safely
be concluded, then, that section 214 is redistributive in the sense
outlined above.
51
Finally, it is dicult to argue that the section seeks to preserve
the relative values of the rights of various claimants. Most
importantly, by creating a potential liability in directors which did
not exist before, section 214 actually upsets relative values as
between them and the ®rm's creditors. Beyond the point where
there is no reasonable prospect of the company's avoiding insolvent
litigation, creditors are protected against loss which could
reasonably have been avoided. But this is only at the expense of
the directors, who lose the protection of limited liability with
respect to this loss.
52 The loss of this protection constitutes an ex
post diminution in the value of the bundle of rights with which the
directors enter the insolvency forum. Even as between creditors, the
section simply does not concern itself with relative values. To
con®rm this, it need only be asked whether directors challenged
under it would be able to escape liability by showing that there was
a strictly proportionate increase in (avoidable) loss to all the
creditors once the company entered the insolvency forum.
Conversely, it is unlikely the liquidator would be able to succeed in
challenging a director under section 214 on the basis that, while the
steps taken by the latter decreased loss to all categories of creditor,
50 Davies, ``Directors' ®duciary duties and individual shareholders'', in McKendrick (ed.),
Commercial Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations (Oxford, 1992), 87.
51 See also the decision of the House of Lords in Winkworth v. Edward Baron Development
Company Ltd. [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1512, 1516F, which creates complications more apparent than
real for the argument here.
52 That section 214 pierces the corporate veil has been recognised both judicially and
academically. For example, see Yukong Lines Ltd. of Korea v. Rendsburg Investments Corp. of
Liberia and Others (No. 2) [1998] 1 W.L.R. 294, 306-A, per Toulson J. quoting Lord Cooke
delivering the 1997 Hamlyn lecture, and Williams and McGee, ``Un®t directors'', 5.
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the decrease in that loss was greater for some than for other
creditors. Again, then, it is clear the wrongful trading provisions, in
addition to being redistributive, are not concerned with preserving
relative values of pre-insolvency rights.
III. CAN THE HYPOTHETICAL BARGAIN JUSTIFY THE SECTION 214 DUTY?
It has been pointed out that the notional creditors' bargain
provides a satisfactory justi®cation of the coercive basic structure of
insolvency law by suggesting that creditors themselves, negotiating
ex ante, would value the accompanying bene®ts enough to accept
the restrictions. This view is normatively attractive because it
appeals to the virtue of autonomy: the insolvency regime would be
voluntarily accepted as being in their collective best interest by the
very parties subject to its coercion. Could it be shown that
obligations similar to those imposed by section 214 would also be
voluntarily accepted if all the parties aected could be allowed to
participate in the ex ante bargain?
Keep in mind why the hypothetical bargain has been labelled
with reference to the insolvent ®rm's creditors. Why for example
are the shareholders not mentioned? The ex ante bargain seeks to
adopt the standpoint of the parties most directly aected by the
mandatory provisions of the insolvency regime, and asks whether
these parties themselves would accept such restrictions. When the
®rm enters insolvent liquidation, not even its creditorsÐthose
entitled to line up in front of the shareholders for the ®rm's
assetsÐwould get back all they are owed. A fortiori, shareholders
have little hope of recovering anything, and little real interest in the
conduct of the proceedings. So understandably, expositors of the
hypothetical bargain can drop any reference to them. Creditors give
their name to the bargain because the insolvency proceedings deal
most directly with their interests, and the coercion inherent therein
most directly aects them.
Note, though, that the ®rm's shareholders are in fact silent
parties to the hypothetical agreement. They have bargained for the
residual claim on the ®rm's pro®ts and assets, once other liabilities
are met. Put dierently, they have agreed to postpone their claims
to those of the ®rm's creditors in return for the ®nal and unlimited,
though contingent, rights to the ®rm.
53 If the ®rm were to be
53 This does no more than re-state the basic nature of the shareholders' claims, while focusing
on the fact that a ®rm is essentially a voluntary nexus of various contractual rights. Note that
whatever lawyers may think, there is no inherent fundamental economic dierence between
debt and equity claims. Both sorts of claimant contribute to the ®rm's assets, and both bear
some degree of risk. See the seminal work by Modigliani and Miller, ``The cost of capital,
corporate ®nance and the theory of investment'' (1958) 48 American Economic Review 261.
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liquidated solvent, its shareholders would be waiting patiently at
the end of the queue while prior claimants vindicated their ®xed
rights. In an insolvent liquidation, shareholders drop out of the
picture ex post, but this is precisely because they are parties to the
agreement ex ante, inducing creditors to lend to the ®rm by
promising to subordinate their position to that of the lenders. Once
it is realised that shareholders are in fact party to the ``creditors'''
bargain, it becomes possible to attempt an exposition of the
bargain with a view to justifying the section 214 duty.
Let's start with an introduction to the notion of agency costs.
54
Lawyers are of course familiar with the legal concept of agency. In
the economics literature, an agency relationship is de®ned much
more broadly as existing whenever ``there is an arrangement in
which one person's [the principal's] welfare depends on what
another person [the agent] does.''
55 Agency costs will arise whenever
both parties are concerned to maximise their own utility, and this
being so, ``there is good reason to believe the agent will not always
act in the best interests of the principal.''
56 The principal can try to
overcome this problem by designing a set of incentives which bring
together the agent's interests and his own. The principal can also
divert resources to checking on and controlling the agent's
activities. The costs of these eorts are referred to as monitoring
costs. In certain circumstances discussed below, the agent himself
would have an incentive to oer guarantees against his own
misbehaviour, perhaps by providing for mechanisms which would
compensate the principal at the agent's expense, if the latter does
misbehave. Such activities are generically called bonding. Finally,
and despite the existence of monitoring and bonding mechanisms, it
is suggested there would still be some divergence between the
decisions the agent ought to take in order to maximise his
principal's utility, and the decisions he would in fact take.
57 This
loss in utility is referred to as the residual loss. Agency costs are
then de®ned as the sum of monitoring and bonding costs and the
residual loss.
58 It is to be noted that all references to agency in this
paper are to thisÐand not the legalÐnotion of agency.
Look again at the typical (and grossly over-simpli®ed) structure
of a limited liability ®rm. Shareholders provide the initial capital in
54 Most relevant here is Jensen and Meckling, ``Theory of the ®rm: managerial behavior, agency
costs and ownership structure'' (1976) 3 J. Financial Economics 305.
55 Pindyck and Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, (New Jersey, 1998) (4th ed.), at 632. See also Jensen
and Meckling, ``Theory'', at 308.
56 Jensen and Meckling, ``Theory'', at 308.
57 This is because ``the cost of full enforcement of [monitoring and bonding] contracts exceeds
the bene®ts''; see Fama and Jensen, ``Agency problems and residual claims'' (1983) 26 Journal
of Law and Economics 327, at 327.
58 Jensen and Meckling, ``Theory'', at 308.
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return for a contingent but unlimited residual claim on the ®rm,
and decision-making and day-to-day oversight are entrusted to the
company's managers. Creditors lend a certain amount at a price,
with the promise of repayment over a speci®ed period. Note that
the managers are under legal obligations to further the interests of
the company, which equates to the interests of the shareholders
while the ®rm is solvent. With this in mind, assume for the moment
that managers act on behalf of shareholders in administering the
®rm, and that there is an identity of interests between them.
59 It
should be obvious that the existence of debt in the ®rm's capital
structure creates agency costs. The welfare of creditors lies in being
paid interest over the pendency of the loan, and in having the
capital repaid in full at the loan's maturity. But once the debt
contract is concluded, the money is dealt with by the ®rm's
managers, who wish to bene®t a totally dierent class of claimant.
In trying to maximise the shareholders' collective utility, managers
rationally have an incentive to deviate from the course most likely
to maximise utility to creditors. Note that this incentive becomes
more potent as the ®rm teeters on the brink of insolvent
liquidation:
As long as the debtor's business prospects remain good, a
strong reputational incentive deters misbehavior. But once the
business environment deteriorates, the [®rm's decision-maker] is
increasingly in¯uenced by a ``high-roller'' strategy. The poorer
the prospects for a pro®table conclusion to the venture, the
less the entrepreneur has to risk and the more he stands to
gain from imprudent or wrongful conduct.
60
At least three dierent forms of creditor/manager agency costs
are relevant to the argument here.
61 The ®rst, labelled asset
substitution, arises because, after the debt contract has been entered
into, managers have an incentive to increase the riskiness of the
relevant part of the company's business, choosing to opt for a
strategy which promises to pay more but with a smaller probability.
59 The assumption is reasonable, obviously for managers of closely-held ®rms, but to a degree,
even for those of publicly-held ones. See Chens, 522: ``In public companies, this alignment
[of shareholder and manager interests] can occur because of a combination of contractual
terms (e.g., managerial remuneration packages) and market factors (e.g., the market for
corporate control)'' [footnote omitted]. But of course it should never be forgotten that rational
managers would actually seek to maximise their own utility, and this creates con¯icts (i.e.
agency costs) between them and shareholders. So the assumption made in the text here is
relaxed in the next Section, when the dierences between openly- and closely-held ®rms is
considered, and in the ®nal Section of this paper, where the incentives created by section 214
are examined.
60 Scott, ``Relational theory'', at 624.
61 For an overview, see Drukarczyk, ``Secured debt, bankruptcy, and the creditors' bargain
model'' (1991) 11 International Review of Law and Economics 203, 205±207 and Scott,
``Relational theory'', 919±921.
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Since debtors are limited to their ®xed claims, any increased returns
are captured wholly by the shareholders, but losses are shared by
the creditors as well. Crucially, the incentive to substitute is
heightened when the ®rm becomes ®nancially distressed. If it enters
insolvent liquidation, shareholders would simply drop out of the
picture. There is every reason for managers, acting in the
shareholders' interests, to venture the ®rm's resources on
increasingly desperate strategies, gambling on the possibility that
the ®rm would recover. At the very least, in a bid to stave o
liquidation, managers might sell o the ®rm's less essential physical
assets (e.g. ``nonspeci®c equipment that comprises excess capacity''),
using the money to buy employee hours, which are valuable only if
the ®rm recovers.
62 Physical assets previously available to meet
creditors' claims no longer remain in the company's ownership.
The second type of cost arises because once managers have
committed the ®rm to a particular debt contract, they have an
incentive to oer equal or higher priority to another creditor. This
dilutes the original lender's claim, forcing him to compete with, or
be subordinated to, the new lender. Again, this con¯ict intensi®es
when the ®rm is in trouble. ``Management might, for example, have
the debtor borrow from a later secured creditor to meet payroll in
an attemptÐfoolish from the investors' collective perspectiveÐto
keep the ®rm in business long enough for a possible but unlikely
reversal of fortune.''
63
A third category of cost arises because managers possess more,
and more accurate, information about the ®rm's prospects and the
riskiness of its strategies, than creditors.
64 Yet again, this is critical
when the ®rm is having diculties. Creditors need reassurance this
information would be used to decide in the collective interest when
the ®rm should be made subject to the collective insolvency
proceedings, but managers have an incentive to withhold it for
precisely that reason. They serve the sectional interests of
shareholders. To allow the ®rm to enter the insolvency forum is to
lose the chance of preventing the shareholders' equity becoming
worthless.
65
Imagine now the (hypothetical) instant in time when the ex ante
bargain is concluded. Creditors and shareholders alike realise that
lending to the ®rm by creditors would give rise to the agency costs
described above, managers striving to act in the shareholders'
interests and to the creditors' detriment. Now creditors could
62 Adler, ``An equity-agency solution to the bankruptcy-priority puzzle'' (1993) 22 J. Legal
Studies 73, 82.
63 Ibid., at 80.
64 Drukarczyk, ``Secured debt'', at 206±207.
65 Other types of agency costs include asset conversion and under-investment; ibid.
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contract for the right to monitor managers' actions. Monitoring
would then be carried out during the pendency of the loans to the
point where the additional advantage from monitoring any further
equals the additional cost of the monitoring activities. It is
important to realise, though, that as long as creditors anticipate the
existence of these additional costs, they take them into account
when deciding what to charge the ®rm for their loans. So
monitoring costs are passed on to the ®rm, and to those who have
bargained for a residual claim on it. It is the ®rm's shareholders
and not its creditors who suer these costs, since more of the ®rm's
income goes to service its debt, and less remains for disbursement
to the residual claimants.
66
How would creditors monitor the managers' activities? They
would bargain, for example, for the right to have the ®rm's
accounts audited by independent experts, to include explicit
contractual terms restricting managers' freedom of action, and to
arrange for the ®rm's control to pass to those owing allegiance to
them once insolvent liquidation is inevitable. But shareholders
might want managers to have independent accounts prepared in
any case for their own inspection. It would also be cheaper for
shareholders simply to accept that in case the ®rm becomes
seriously troubled, managers should be required to protect the
interests of creditors. Note that anticipating the speci®c steps
required of the managers of a troubled ®rm in all circumstances
would be expensive for creditors and shareholders bargaining ex
ante. Managers themselves, actually faced with the particular
circumstances of their ®rm, would presumably be best placed to
ascertain what needed to be done, and shareholders would oer at
the bargaining stage to put them under an open-ended duty.
67 To
put it dierently, it is in the shareholders' own interests to require
managers to bond themselves broadly to the creditors when there is
no reasonable prospect of the ®rm avoiding insolvent liquidation.
Whether it is the creditors who monitor managers, or the managers
who bond themselves to creditors, it is the shareholders who bear
the costs. Shareholders would prefer bonding over monitoring since
that is likely to be cheaper in many circumstances:
68 ``When
monitoring costs, such as direct supervision, are high relative to
actions by the debtor that reassure the creditor, both parties will
agree ex ante to substitute cost-eective bonding alternatives.''
69
So a section 214-type duty would be accepted by shareholders in
66 For a formal proof, see Jensen and Meckling, ``Theory'', 338±339.
67 IA, s. 214 (3) reverses the burden of proof, requiring managers to demonstrate they took
``every step'' they ought to have taken (s 214 (4)) to minimise potential loss to creditors.
68 Jensen and Meckling, ``Theory'', 325±326 and 338.
69 Scott, ``Relational theory'', 927±928.
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the ex ante bargain. It is important to emphasise here that contrary
to appearances, it is not generally the managers who suer most
directly because of this coercive duty. It is the shareholders who
``pay'' for this duty in the broad sense by being deprived of the
managers' allegiance at the time that they have the most to lose.
But of course they would choose to be thus deprived, in return for
the lower interest rates the ®rm would have to pay on the credit it
incurs during its lifetime. This is not to imply that managers are
not aected at all by section 214. Managers might, for example,
want to keep the troubled ®rm trading in order not to lose their
job, and the freedom to do so is curtailed by the wrongful trading
provisions. The next Section shows how they too would voluntarily
accept a section 214-type obligation.
IV. PREDICTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS
The agency cost analysis of section 214 suggests that the duty
imposed thereunder would not be equally relevant to all types of
®rm, nor would all types of creditor stand equally in need of its
protection. Section 214 is merely one way in which parties
bargaining ex ante would seek to overcome creditor/manager
agency problems. The view outlined above implies that where more
eective or more focused ways of overcoming these problems are
available, section 214 would be far less important. In this respect,
the role of the market for managerial labour, and of secured credit,
is especially important.
A. The in¯uence of the market for managerial labour
70
In an ``openly-held'' ®rm, where the residual risk-bearers
(shareholders) are dierent from the decision-makers (managers),
the latter are subject to the discipline of the managerial labour
market. The ®rm itself is always in the market for new talent, and
seeks to attract it by promising to reward performance. Existing
managers too are concerned with the eciency with which the ®rm
can dierentiate the good from the indierent decision-maker; the
former would be the ®rst to leave if the ®rm responds sluggishly to
the distinction.
71 Further, how well the manager performs in his
current position determines not just his present but his future
income as well. Remember that managers have invested their
human capital heavily in the ®rm's fortunes. More than the typical
shareholder, who is likely to hold a diverse portfolio of equity in
many ®rms, and the typical creditor, who is likely to be supplying
70 The ground-breaking work on this point is Fama, ``Agency problems and the theory of the
®rm'' (1980) 88 J. Political Economy 288.
71 Ibid., 292.
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goods or credit to many ®rms, the manager's investment is ®rm-
speci®c. So the value of the manager's human capital is linked very
closely to the fortunes of his ®rm:
For the purposes of the managerial labor market, the previous
associations of a manager with success and failure are
information about his talents. The manager of a ®rm ... may
not suer any immediate gain or loss in current wages from
the current performance of his team, but the success or failure
of the team impacts his future wages, and this gives the
manager a stake in the success of the team.
72
The managerial labour market exercises control over the
manager by ensuring that his future wage re¯ects his current
performance. Indolence or mismanagement on his part aect the
fortunes of his ®rm, which in turn signals the managerial labour
market to revise downwards the rewards he can expect in the
future. If he has contracted to provide a certain quality of oversight
of the ®rm's aairs, the market judges him according to how
successfully he delivers it. Any failure on his part is compensated
for by the lower wages the market is willing to oer him in the
future.
73 The impact of this downward revision on the performance
of the rational manager does not just lie in the future, though. The
present value of his human capital is a function both of the stream
of present wages, but also of the stream of future wages. So the
manager's current performance aects his current wealth. He has
an incentive to deliver the performance he promised.
Crucially, though on the margins, the managerial labour
market's assessment of his performance encompasses how the
manager is likely to behave towards his ®rm's creditors when the
®rm is distressed. Remember that the capital market anticipates the
incentives he has at that time to act in the shareholders' (and his
own) interest, and thus to the creditors' detriment. The additional
costs implied by this are passed on to the ®rm's residual claimants
as a rise in the interest rate. This aects the labour market:
shareholders (residual claimants) would seek to pass on this extra
cost to the managers themselves by ensuring that the ®rm pays less
to managers if employing them makes it more expensive for it to
borrow. Similarly, they would have an incentive ex ante to send the
correct signal to their company's creditors by employing the right
sort of management:
[T]he reputational integrity of managers is a bond that
shareholders can post to other stakeholders [especially
creditors] that reduces the costs of monitoring and
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., 297±298.
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contracting... [M]anagerial reputational bonds are so valuable
in facilitating cost eective contracting that `shareholders ...
(will) seek out or train individuals who are capable of
commitment to stakeholders, elevate them to management, and
entrench them'.
74
And as explained above, this creates an incentive for managers
not to misbehave vis-aÁ-vis the ®rm's creditors when the ®rm gets
into diculty. The fact that a ®rm (partially) under a manager's
control is at the point where there are no reasonable prospects of
avoiding insolvent liquidation is itself likely to convey information
about the manager's abilities to the managerial labour market
detrimental to his future prospects. The need for him to act
competently and scrupulously after this point therefore becomes
even more important. He has an incentive to signal to the market
that he is capable of eectively doing all any reasonably competent
manager would do to abate the damage done to the company's
creditors (who, as it happens, are also the company's new residual
``owners''):
[I]n light of their imminent re-entry into the job market,
managers may reason that the best strategy to adopt in a
distress situation is one of honesty and integrity. Rather than
using wrongdoing as a way of gambling the company back to
success, the managers may decide to avoid scrupulously any
hint of wrongdoing out of a concern for in¯icting irrevocable
damage to their reputational capital in the managerial job
market.
75
This argument yields the prediction that the section 214 duty
would be more important for ®rms whose managers are not
concerned about the value of their managerial services in that
market. Here, section 214 would be the primary way of countering
creditor/manager agency problems. Returning for a minute to the
hypothetical bargain, creditors would therefore be more interested
in being oered a section 214-type bond when dealing with ®rms
likely to be run by decision-makers immune to labour market
discipline. Further, managers who are so immune would want to
oer a section 214-type bond in order to signal that they would not
misbehave, since the freedom to misbehave they otherwise have
creates additional costs for the ®rm which are passed on to them in
the form of lower salaries and less desirable employment
prospects.
76
74 Daniels, ``Must boards go overboard?'' (1994±5) 24 Canadian Business Law Journal 229, 241
fn. 43, quoting Shleifer and Summers, ``Breach of trust in hostile takeovers'' in Auerbach
(ed.), Corporate Takeovers (Chicago, 1988), at 40.
75 Daniels, ``Boards'', 241.
76 Or a lower return on their shares in the ®rm; see below on closely-held companies.
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Now the wording of the actual section of the Insolvency Act
1986 makes no distinctions based on how severely a particular
manager is subject to the labour market's discipline. But this is
reasonable. Firms might go through periods where its managers
were more or less subject to that discipline. For example, a
manager approaching the end of his working life would be
increasingly unaected by the incentives of the labour market. It
would be prohibitively expensive to design a bond which applied
with the correct force just at the right time. An all-encompassing
obligation is more cost-eective, given the variability of the degree
of in¯uence of the managerial market and the diverse reasons for
those dierences. Still, one would expect the practical signi®cance
of the bond to be greater, the smaller the in¯uence of the market.
Most obviously, managers of closely-held ®rms, who also own a
substantial proportion of the ®rm's equity, are somewhat more
immune to labour market incentives.
77 They are not threatened
with the loss of their job if they deliver a performance inferior to
the one they promised ex ante, since they are in a position qua
shareholders to ratify this breach. Put dierently, the ®rm derives
idiosyncratic (i.e. non-market) value from employing them. Further,
most closely-held ®rms restrict the alienability of their shares.
78 This
means that the take-over mechanism, which limits managers' ability
to engage in behaviour detrimental to the value of the ®rm, is
``unimportant in creating incentives to operate eciently''.
79 A
consistently poor performance of course decreases the shareholder-
manager's wealth, but there is nothing to overcome manager/
creditor agency problems. The manager is not going to be ®red by
his ®rm, and is therefore not as concerned with keeping a clean
record to smooth his future passage in the managerial market.
Entrenched as he is in his current position, he does not see himself
in the market for managerial talent.
When the ®rm is on the verge of insolvent liquidation, it might
be thought that a more detached actor in the shareholder-
manager's shoes would realise that, his ®rm no longer being viable,
his behaviour vis-aÁ-vis creditors might aect his future prospects.
But this is not necessarily the case:
At least for some [closely-held] ®rms, the owner-manager will
anticipate making substantial nonpecuniary or sentimental
investments during the life of the enterprise. These investments
are re¯ected in common metaphors such as ``It's my life's
work,'' and ``My name is over the door.'' Furthermore, an
77 Generally on closely-held companies, see Easterbrook and Fischel, ``Close corporations and
agency costs'' (1986) 38 Stanford L.R. 271.
78 Ibid., 273; Farrar et al., Farrar's Company Law (London, 1998), 519.
79 Easterbrook and Fischel, ``Close corporations'', 276.
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owner-manager's ®rm-speci®c investment is essentially
nondiversi®able.
80
Since the shareholder-manager is likely to have invested a
signi®cant proportion of his wealth, material and non-pecuniary, in
the ®rm, and since this investment is likely to be undiversi®ed, he
can be expected to ®ght even more single-mindedly to keep the ®rm
a¯oat.
So the shareholder-manager's identi®cation with his ®rm remains
strong. Correspondingly, the in¯uence of the managerial labour
market remains small. The agency cost view of section 214 suggests
the legal duty to have regard to the interests of creditors when
insolvency becomes inevitable would be more relevant to directors
of closely-held ®rms. Creditors lending to such ®rms would want to
charge a higher interest rate in order to be compensated for the
greater risk of eve-of-insolvency misbehaviour. For the same reason
and in order to avoid having to pay more, shareholder-managers
would be willing ex ante to oer a section 214-type bond.
A similar argument applies to shadow directors. Consider a
simple example. Director D calculates that the value of his human
capital varies in line with the fortunes of Firm X, for which he has
contracted to provide oversight and decision-making. Yet the board
of Firm Y, which is wholly owned by Firm X, are accustomed to
act according to the directions of either D himself, or of the whole
of Firm X's board of directors. In fact, then, D or X itself might
be shadow directors of Y.
81 But neither is subject to the discipline
of the managerial labour market. This is obviously true in case of
X; the rise and fall of the value of Y might have an eect on X's
own well-being, but X simply is not an actor on the supply side of
the managerial labour market, and there is no counter-weight
provided by that market to X's incentive to further its own self-
interest to the detriment of Y's creditors. But X's director D too
considers that the market has no reason to judge him by looking at
the fortunes of Y. D has no explicit contractual obligations towards
Y, and prima facie, in calculating D's future wages, the labour
market disregards the actions he induces Y's board to take, even
though those actions hurt Y's creditors on the eve of Y's insolvent
liquidation. This is because the interests of Y's creditors would not
necessarily be coterminous with those of X's creditors. There might
even be a con¯ict between them. Director D's future prospects in
the labour market depend of course on how his actions aect the
fortunes of his own ®rm's stakeholders. Here again, it can be
80 Jackson and Scott, ``Bankruptcy'', 174.
81 IA, s. 251.
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predicted that section 214 would provide the more important
bulwark against anti-creditor actions. One normative
recommendation would then be that courts, contrary to their
present bias,
82 be somewhat more willing to hold shadows liable for
wrongful trading.
Is there any empirical con®rmation for these predictions? An
interesting exercise would be to examine decided cases where
wrongful trading (as de®ned by section 214) was an issue. It must
be emphasised that such an exercise would not produce results
which were statistically signi®cant, since the sample size would be
too small in relation to the total number of ®nancially distressed
®rms, and since there is probably a preponderance of closely-held
®rms as a proportion of all the ®rms in the economy.
83 Further,
decisions which ®nd their way into print, or whose transcripts are
readily available, are not necessarily a good guide to the factual
circumstances where a legally-imposed section 214-type duty is most
relevant, especially in cases where the section 214 claim in never
litigated. Having said that, a particular trend in these decisions
might provide some (`impressionistic') insight into the role of
section 214 as a secondary device for controlling agency problems.
A rough and ready survey of the English and Welsh cases
provides interesting results. Information is available about ®ve
decisions where a section 214 claim was successful, and in all these
cases, at least one of the wrongfully trading directors had a
substantial shareholding.
84 In another seven decisions, the court
indicated that the facts revealed the directors might have been
trading wrongfully. These decisions concern claims under section
214 by the liquidator where a preliminary point was litigated, or
where an allegation amounting to wrongful trading was made as
part of an application to disqualify a director. Again, all of these
cases concern closely-held ®rms.
85 Further, there are six decisions
82 See Bhattacharyya, ``Shadow directors and wrongful trading revisited'' (1995) Company
Lawyer, 16(10), 313.
83 Farrar, 518±519; Carsberg et al., Small Company Financial Reporting (Englewood Clis, 1985)
at 79.
84 The brackets following the case citation indicate the proportion of the issued shares of the
company held by the relevant director, where this information is available or can be surmised
from the facts: Re Brian D Pierson (Contractors) Ltd. [1999] B.C.C. 26 (H and W between
them held 100%); Re Fairmont Tours (Yorkshire) Ltd. (unreported) noted in Insolvency
Litigation and Practice, July 1996, 12 (100%); Re Purpoint Ltd. [1991] B.C.L.C. 491 (100%);
Re DKG Contractors Ltd.; Lewis v. DKG Contractors Ltd. [1990] B.C.C. 903 (98%); Re
Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. (No. 2) [1989] B.C.L.C. 520 (50%).
85 Re TLL, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Collins and others (Ch. D, 27 November
1998) (Transcript) (5%, plus an option for another 5%); Re Leading Guides International Ltd.
(in liq.) [1998] 1 B.C.L.C. 620 (100%); Re Sykes (Butchers) Ltd. (in liq.); Secretary of State
for Trade and Industry v. Richardson and another [1998] 1 B.C.L.C. 110 (at least 20% of one
relevant company by director against whom the application to disqualify succeeded); Secretary
of State for Trade and Industry v. Laing and others [1996] 2 B.C.L.C. 324 (the disquali®ed de
jure director held at least 51% shares at all material times); Re Living Images Ltd. [1996] 1
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where applications for a section 214 contribution were abandoned
or lost at trial or struck out for want of prosecution, or where an
application to disqualify a director on charges amounting to
wrongful trading failed, and all of these ®rms seem closely held as
well.
86 Even these `failures' are instructive for the purposes of this
paper: whether the allegations of wrongful trading stick or not, it is
only where the in¯uence of the managerial labour market is weak
that issues concerning the legal solution to creditor/manager agency
problems are likely to arise. Eight cases concerned with possible
wrongful trading issues were litigated where the target of the
(potential) action was alleged to be a shadow director.
87 For the
sake of completeness, no relevant information was available in two
cases,
88 and the one reported case where an administration order
was sought (in extreme haste), inter alia, explicitly to avoid any
wrongful trading by the directors seems to involve an openly-held
company.
89
So of the 25 decisions where relevant information was available,
24 concern either closely-held ®rms, or shadow directors, or both.
90
B.C.L.C. 348 (99%); Re Keypack Homecare Ltd. [1987] B.C.L.C. 409 (unclear, but seems to
be closely-held); International Westminster Bank plc v. Okeanos Maritime Corporation [1987] 3
All E.R. 137 (again unclear, but again, seems to be closely-held).
86 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Blake and others [1997] 1 B.C.L.C. 728 (seems
closely-held); Re Grayan Building Services Ltd. (in liq.) [1995] Ch. 241 CA, [1995] B.C.C. 554
HL (100%); Re Farmizer (Products) Ltd.; Moore and another v. Gadd and another [1997] 1
B.C.L.C. 589 (CA), [1995] 2 B.C.L.C. 462 (HC) (100%); Re MC Bacon Ltd. [1991] Ch. 127
(again, seems closely-held); Re Sykes (Butchers) Ltd. (in liq.); Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry v. Richardson and another [1998] 1 B.C.L.C. 110 (80% by director against whom
the application to disqualify failed); Ward (liquidator of Span Technology Ltd.) v. Sellors and
others (CA, 27 October 1997) (Transcript) (100%); Re Sherborne Associates Ltd. [1995] B.C.C.
40 (36%, 36%, and 3% of the initial shares issued).
87 Burgoine and another v. Waltham Forest London Council and another (Transcript), 95 L.G.R.
520, The Times, 7 Nov. 1996 (The Council here was clearly a shadow director, as well as
owning 50% shares in the company); Re Oasis [1998] Ch. 170 (very inadequate information
on the subject, but some directors were shadows); Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd. [1994] 2
B.C.L.C. 180 (on the facts, claim against the parent company as shadow failed); Re Latreefers
Inc., Stocznia Gdanska SA v. Latreefers Inc. [1999] 1 B.C.L.C. 271 (Court thought a section
214 claim might exist); Re a Company (No. 005009 of 1987), ex p. Cropp and another [1989]
B.C.L.C. 13; International Westminster Bank plc v. Okeanos Maritime Corporation [1987] 3 All
E.R. 137 (seems shadows were involved); Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Laing
and others [1996] 2 B.C.L.C. 324 (held that directors of the company which had abortively
tried to purchase the now-insolvent ®rm were not shadows); Re PFTZM Lid [1995] 2
B.C.L.C. 354 (Bank was major creditor of closely-held company; its ocers were held not to
be the insolvent company's shadows).
88 Hughes and another v. Beckett and others (CA, 6 April 1998) (Transcript) (public company,
but no information as to whether any director had substantial shareholdings, or whether a
shadow was involved); R v. Millard (CA Criminal Division) (unreported) noted in [1994]
Crim. L.R. 146 (conviction for fraudulent trading; issue was length of disquali®cation).
89 Re Chancery plc [1991] B.C.L.C. 712.
90 The one exception is Re Howard Holdings Inc.; Norton Coles and Others v. Thompson [1998]
B.C.C. 549. An interesting feature of this case is the fact that, while the three directors subject
to the present claim were not shareholders of the company or shadows, neither did they
exercise any real control over the company's aairs. The company's management was actually
undertaken by E, who was either a de facto or a shadow director (550F; Millett J's dictum in
Re Hydorodam [1994] 2 B.C.L.C. 180 emphasising the mutual exclusivity of the two
relationships is duly noted here, but there is not sucient information to ascertain which label
better describes E's position). Proceedings against the three nominal directors seem to have
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Bearing in mind the statistical insigni®cance of these results and the
possible bias in the sample, all that can be said is that they at least
do nothing to discon®rm the hypothesis that the section 214 duty is
relevant primarily to managers who are not subject to the full
discipline of the managerial labour market. It can be expected that
most wrongful trading claims would be brought against such
managers.
91
B. The role of secured credit
Consider now the eect of the existence of secured credit. The role
of security in overcoming agency problems has long been
recognised, even though there is little consensus on how it works,
on what sort of incentives it creates, and on whether it is cost-
eective collectively for the ®rm and its creditors!
92 But the debate
rages mainly on whether there are net bene®ts of secured credit.
93
Hardly anyone doubts that security helps control agency for the
secured creditor himself, and it is this uncontroversial proposition
which forms the basis for the argument in the rest of this section.
It is important to realise that secured credit itself represents a
form of bonding by management to secured creditors.
94 Recall the
various forms of creditor/manager agency costs discussed in the
previous section as they exist on the eve of the ®rm's insolvent
liquidation. The secured creditor has the ®rst claim against the
assets the debtor has oered as collateral, and this priority is good
against any subsequent purchaser or lender. The initial creditor is
immune from having his claim diluted by the debtor taking on
(unauthorised) higher priority debt after contracting with him. He
is also protected from the incentive the debtor's managers have to
increase the risk he must bear:
If ... after a fully secured loan, management has the ®rm
borrow additional funds from a subsequent creditor and then
squander those additional funds on a risky project, the initial
creditor receives payment in full before the subsequent lender
been initiated because E had been adjudged bankrupt, and his whereabouts were uncertain
(551E).
91 Discussion here has been restricted to directors of closely-held ®rms and shadows. But the
prediction generated by the agency analysis of the wrongful trading provisions applies
wherever the labour market's in¯uence is weak. This is truer for older directors than younger
ones, and for non-executive directors who are not professional managers than career
managers, etc.
92 See e.g. Jackson and Kronman, ``Secured ®nancing and priorities among creditors'', (1979) 88
Yale L.J. 1143; Levmore, ``Monitors and freeriders in commercial and corporate settings'',
(1982) 92 Yale L.J. 49; Scott, ``Relational theory'' (1986); Drukarczyk, ``Secured debt'' (1991);
Adler, ``Equity-agency'' (1993); LoPucki, ``The unsecured creditor's bargain'' (1994) 80 Virginia
L.R. 1887.
93 For a persuasive argument and evidence that ``new money'' secured credit has bene®ts for
secured and unsecured creditors, see Schwarcz, ``The easy case for the priority of secured
claims in bankruptcy'' (1992) 47 Duke L.J. 425.
94 See e.g. Adler, ``Equity-agency'', at 77.
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receives any property from the ®rm... [When the ®rm
approaches insolvent liquidation,] [s]ecured credit's restriction
on asset substitution can be valuable, [even] if it does nothing
more than prevent a ®rm from cannibalizing itself, perhaps one
Xerox machine at a time [to buy time outside the collective
insolvency forum].
95
Security also has a role as ``hostage'',
96 because the creditor can
seize the collateral if the debtor attempts to misbehave;
alternatively, the creditor can assume control of the relevant
portion of the business by appointing a receiver. In addition, when
the ®rm is ®nancially distressed, other creditors are reluctant to
lend and be subordinated to the secured creditor, and approaching
the latter might be the only way the ®rm can obtain ready credit.
The debtor ®rm's managers therefore have an incentive to keep the
secured creditor abreast of the state and prospects of the ®rm's
business, and he is unlikely to be surprised by the ®rm's distress.
With this in mind, return again to the moment when creditors
and shareholders come together to conclude the hypothetical
bargain. It should be obvious that creditors who intend to extract
security have no need forÐand the ®rm's shareholders and
managers have no incentive to oerÐa section 214-type bond. All
the advantages associated with the section 214-type duty have
already been obtained by secured creditors for their own bene®t in
the process of acquiring security. It is only the unsecured creditors
who have no contractual protection against manager misbehaviour,
and shareholders and managers would bene®t from oering only
them the section 214 bond.
This analysis provides a justi®cation for the Court of Appeal's
decision in Re Oasis Merchandising Services Ltd. that recoveries
from errant directors under section 214 are held by the liquidator
on a statutory trust for the insolvent ®rm's unsecured creditors.
97
This serves to highlight the fact that wrongfully trading directors
have breached their bond obligations to unsecured creditors, who
have also suered the costs resulting from this breach. Secured
creditors do not bene®t from the recoveries under this section
because, simply, they do not need its protection.
This analysis also suggests how secured credit might have
evolved as an alternative to a more general section 214-type bond.
If shareholders and managers derive bene®t from the section 214
duty, why did something very similar not appear voluntarily in
corporate debt contracts before section 214 was enacted?
98 Note
95 Ibid., 78 and 82. Of course the debtor can still do so, but only with the secured creditor's
consent.
96 Scott, ``Relational theory'', 927±928.
97 [1998] Ch. 170, 181A±185H.
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that creditors themselves could not extract a bond too similar to
the section 214 duty. In the real world, all the creditors who would
lend to the ®rm during its existence can not come together to
negotiate collectively with the ®rm's shareholders and managers
before any lending takes place. Each creditor must transact
separately on his own behalf. The problem is that to extract a
promise from the ®rm that on the eve of the debtor's insolvent
liquidation, managers would act to minimise loss to all creditors,
would be to create an externality: the one creditor pays for bene®t
to be conferred on all. Conversely, a promise to minimise loss only
to the one creditor would be to confer a preference on him, and
this oends the policy of insolvency law.
99 Another way would be
for the duty to appear in the articles of association of ®rms,
inserted by the ®rm's founders to signal to all creditors that they
were protected against eve-of-insolvency manager misbehaviour.
But the articles of association constitute a contract, though a
distinctive one with its own special features,
100 between the ®rm's
shareholders, or between them and the ®rm's directors as
representing the company.
101 Legal doctrine regards the ®rm's
creditors as ``outsiders'', not privy to that contract, and therefore
unable to enforce anything contained in the articles of
association.
102 So a duty imposed there for the bene®t of the ®rm's
creditors, not being enforceable by the latter, would provide, at
best, a very weak signal. That component of the interest rate
charged to compensate creditors for the risk of eve-of-insolvency
misbehaviour by the ®rm's managers would therefore be unlikely to
be reduced.
The solution to this would-be problem surely lies in the
existence of third party security. Commercially powerful lenders (i.e.
banks) seek a charge especially from shareholder-managers of
closely-held ®rms over their personal property, including family
homes. This creates a powerful bond, providing banks with eective
ways of preventing misbehaviour at the time that the business is in
trouble.
103 The predominance of this form of bonding might have
98 This question is posed by Chens, 547, as a possible objection to viewing section 214 as
mirroring the agreement interested parties themselves would strike.
99 Re MC Bacon [1990] B.C.L.C. 325. The debtor's desire to prefer would be obvious from the
actions of its managers in having contracted ex ante to do so.
100 Companies Act 1985, s. 14; Bratton Seymour Service Co. Ltd. v. Oxborough [1992] B.C.L.C.
693, CA.
101 Eley v. Positive Government Security Life Association (1876) 1 Ex.D. 88.
102 Hickman v. Kent or Romney Marsh Sheep-Breeders' Association [1915] 1 Ch. 881; Beattie v.
Beattie [1938] Ch. 708; see generally Farrar, 118±124.
103 Chens, 547, also points out that lenders do not usually seek such protection when dealing
with public companies. Adopting the analysis in this Section, this is easy to understand:
contractual protection against eve-of-insolvency misbehaviour by managers of publicly-held
companies is generally super¯uous because of the stronger in¯uence of the market for
managerial labour.
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compensated for the lack ofÐand even impededÐthe evolution of
a more inclusive section 214-type alternative.
V. PERVERSE INCENTIVES
The previous Sections of this paper have suggested that despite
being redistributive, the section 214 duty would be accepted as
being in their interest by the relevant parties negotiating ex ante.
This section examines the eect of the duty on directors both while
their company is healthy, and when it is in terminal decline. Three
dierent types of incentive have been identi®ed,
104 and these are
analysed in turn. Each of these incentives exists because of the
agency relationship between both managers and creditors, and
managers and shareholders, and because when the ®rm is
®nancially distressed, there is a sharp divergence of interests
between shareholders and managers on the one hand, and creditors
on the other. Ineciency exists because managers try to maximise
their own utility. Such behaviour is not utility-maximising from the
creditors' perspective (the punishment, delay and haste eects). It
might even be disadvantageous to shareholders (the punishment
and haste eects).
A. The punishment eect
The punishment eect exists for all ®rms, whether they are healthy
or troubled. Consider the suggestion that the expected value of the
®rm is a function of (inter alia) the eorts and abilities of its
managers. To create incentives for managers to give their best, the
®rm's shareholders, who bene®t from a rise in its value, would
design a pay structure which rewarded the managers when the ®rm
did well, and punished them when it performed poorly. The
existence of debt in the corporate structure opens up the possibility
that the ®rm would be forced into insolvent liquidation if
management fails to provide adequate decision-making and
supervision. In this way, debt itself bonds management to
shareholders, encouraging them to work to avoid this eventuality
and thus in the shareholders' interest. But ``for the bonding role of
debt to be eective, management must suer a signi®cant penalty
for nonpayment of debts, that is, for going bankrupt''.
105 This line
of reasoning suggests a provision of insolvency law which penalises
104 Adopted with some modi®cation from White's insightful modelling of bankruptcy costs in
``The costs of corporate bankruptcy: a US±European comparison'' in Bhandari and Weiss
(eds.), Corporate Bankruptcy (New York, 1996), 467.
105 Aghion et al., ``The economics of bankruptcy reform'' (1992) 8 J. Law, Economics, &
Organization 523, 531 (footnote omitted).
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managers when the ®rm becomes insolvent creates the correct
incentives for diligence and hard work.
But if the managers are risk averse, the punishment eect may
create perverse incentives. Recall that if Claim A carries a certain
£100 return, and Claim B carries a return which might be either
£200 or £0 with equal probability, the risk averse actor chooses
Claim A.
106 Put dierently, he prefers a lower but more stable
stream of income over a higher but more variable one. There is in
fact some evidence that managers in real life are risk averse,
107
which means they ``may work harder if the variability of their
incomes is reduced (i.e., lower income when the ®rm is successful in
return for more lenient treatment when the ®rm is in ®nancial
distress)... This suggests that real world managers may work
harder if they are treated leniently, rather than harshly, when the
®rm is [seriously troubled].''
108
A policy punishing risk averse managers in their ®rm's
insolvency might not then create the correct incentives. It is
important, though, to examine why managers might be risk averse:
One reason for managers' risk aversion may be that the value
of the ®rm depends both on managers' eort and on industry-
wide or economy-wide factors that are beyond the manager[s']
control. If a ®rm is unsuccessful, it could either be because
managers' eort level was low or because factors beyond
managers' control were unfavorable and shareholders may not
be able to distinguish between these two.
109
In other words, managers might be willing to accept responsibility
for the variation in their ®rm's value attributable to their eorts, but
they do not wish to act as insurers for shareholders against a
downturn in the ®rm's fortunes totally unrelated to any action or
omission on their part. This would imply that an insolvency law rule
which focused only on the eorts of managers in penalising them
would create an incentive for them to provide the right level and
quality of decision-making. The same must hold mutatis mutandis as
to the managers' incentives to work in the creditors' interest,
especially on the eve of the ®rm's insolvent liquidation, when
creditors replace shareholders as the ®rm's residual ``owners''.
Now section 214 does penalise managers,
110 making them
106 See generally Pindyck and Rubinfeld, Microeconomics,c h .5 .
107 White, ``Costs'', at 481, citing Jensen and Murphy, ``Performance pay and top-management
incentives'' (1990) 2 J. Political Economy 225.
108 White, ``Costs'', at 481.
109 Ibid., fn. 36.
110 The use of the word ``penal'' in relation to section 214 in this paper should be taken to mean
no more than that it compensates the insolvent company's creditors for a particular category
of loss at the expense of its managers. But see the text later in this sub-section as to the
primary role of the provision.
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personally liable for harm done to the company's creditors. The
concern is not with management's culpability in bringing the ®rm
to the brink of insolvent liquidation, but on what happens past this
point. Interestingly, the provision concerns itself exclusively with the
managers' actions, requiring them to demonstrate they took ``every
step [they] ought to have taken'' to minimise potential loss to
creditors.
111 Note also that the steps required of them are those
``which would be ... taken[] by a reasonably diligent person''
having both the skill and expertise ``that may reasonably be
expected'' of someone occupying that position, and the knowledge
and experience possessed by the actual managers respectively.
112 It
is clear, then, that section 214 does not require of managers
anything they ought not to be expected to bring to their job, and it
does not require them to bear the risk of extraneous factors
aecting the ®rm's health. If the analysis above is correct (and
depending on what other reasons, apart from the one mentioned,
make managers risk averse), section 214 does in fact create the
proper incentive for managers to provide the service they were
contracted to provide.
A ®nal word on the punishment eect. It is vital to realise that
``if the goal is to design an economically ecient bankruptcy law,
then the eects of the law on ®rms that are in ®nancial distress or
bankruptcy are less important than the incentives that the law sets
up for managers of healthy ®rms''.
113 The reason is that only a
small proportion of the ®rms in the economy at any time are in the
formal insolvency forum, and only a somewhat greater number are
in ®nancial distress. The punishment eect is by far the most
important of the incentives discussed in this Section because it
applies to managers of all the ®rms in the economy.
114 It follows
that it would be misguided to judge the ecacy or otherwise of the
punishment eect created by section 214 only by looking at the
number of proceedings brought by liquidators or the number of
successful recoveries made under it.
115 In fact, the eect of the
section is somewhat more abstract, bringing very close to home for
all directors the reality of the interests of unsecured creditors
throughout the ®rm's life. Empirically, a more accurate approach
would be to compare the dividends paid out in all insolvent
liquidations as a percentage of the value of all unsecured claims,
111 Section 214(3).
112 Section 214(4).
113 White, ``Costs'', 467; see also 496.
114 Ibid., 491.
115 Criticism on this basis has come for example from Chens, 545, and the sources cited
therein (fn 269).
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before and after the coming into force of the provision.
116 This
would indicate whether the section is successful in its aim of
encouraging directors to minimise loss to creditors on the eve of
their company's insolvency.
The analysis above also suggests a partial answer to critics of
penal provisions like section 214 who argue that it is pointless to
pursue directors of failed companies who might have oered
personal security to banks etc., or have invested heavily in their
®rm while it was on its deathbed. The liquidator, wielding his
section 214 claim, would be unable to recover much from them for
the company's creditors.
117 This criticism focuses too narrowly on
the position when the ®rm is already distressed, and overlooks the
fact that the punishment eect associated with the wrongful trading
provisions exists through out the time that the ®rm is in operation.
The dominant role of section 214 is not to make good a particular
category of loss to the company's creditors, but to encourage
managers to do all they reasonably ought to, to minimise that loss
in the ®rst place.
118
B. The delay eect
This incentive arises where managers anticipate a harsh treatment
in insolvency proceedings, and take steps to avoid putting their
®nancially troubled company into the insolvency forum. Recall also
the argument that creating new rights only within the insolvency
forum causes those who lose out as a result (the insolvent ®rm's
directors, in the case of section 214) to try to avoid that forum
altogether.
119 If the company is inecient, so that its assets would
be better used elsewhere or under new management, the incentive
to delay the onset of formal proceedings is perverse.
120 The paradox
is that the harsher the treatment of the managers of insolvent ®rms,
the greater is the incentive for managers to work hard,
121 and the
smaller the number of ®rms which are ®nancially distressed because
of manager ineciency in the ®rst place.
122
Look at the costs resulting from maintaining the ®rm's assets in
an inecient use U1; let the value of the ®rm engaged in U1 be
V(U1). Suppose these assets can be put to another more pro®table
116 The ratio of recoveries to claims should rise as knowledge of the section and the duties it
imposes becomes more widespread.
117 See e.g. Baird, ``Initiation'', 223, and Williams and McGee, ``Un®t directors''.
118 For the view that lack of litigation under the section might be undermining its ability to
in¯uence manager behaviour, see Chens, 545.
119 See Section I, above.
120 White, ``Costs'', 485.
121 Subject to the remarks about risk aversion, above.
122 White, ``Costs'', 485. As has already been noted, ®rms might be distressed for industry- and
economy-wide reasons and not because of any management shortcoming.
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use, U2, which would increase the value of the ®rm to V(U2).
Creditors would bene®t from the ®rm being committed to the new
enterprise. Alternatively, the diktats of economic eciency might
demand that the ®rm be liquidated at the earliest, so that the assets
can move to the higher value use.
123 But managers might not
choose either alternative. They would not adopt the more ecient
use of the ®rm's assets because ``[their] human capital [was]
specialized to the old use of [the ®rm's] capital'',
124 and they would
not cause the ®rm to enter the insolvency forum because they
would lose their jobs. The delay eect includes the opportunity cost
of the forgone use U2, which is V(U2)ÿV(U1).
125 In addition,
managers would contrive to keep the ®rm out of the insolvency
regime's reach either by choosing excessively risky projects (over-
investment), or by conserving cash (under-investment), or by
inducing creditors to lend to them in return for a charge on the
®rm's assets (claim dilution).
126 When the ®rm is ®nally liquidated,
there would not be much left for its unsecured creditors.
Consider now the eect of section 214, which is redistributive
and ``harsh''.
127 Does it create perverse incentives for directors to
postpone the moment at which the insolvency regime applies? It is
suggested here that the reverse is in fact true. Recall that once there
remains no reasonable prospect of their ®rm avoiding insolvent
liquidation, directors are required to take every step they ought to
take to minimise harm to creditors. To continue with the notation
employed above, section 214 compels directors to choose at the
earliest to commit the ®rm's assets to their most valuable use, U2,
since that is one of the steps reasonable directors faced with that
situation would take. If this is not done, the opportunity cost
[V(U2)ÿV(U1)] is in fact the harm done to the ®rm's creditors by
the directors' omission, and this amount is a constituent of the
total amount of their liability. In the alternative and more
generously for them, they might be ordered to contribute ``the
amount by which the company's assets can be discerned to have
been depleted''
128 by the continuation of the company's business
beyond the point at which the directors ought to have concluded
liquidation was more ecient a choice than continuation in use U1.
Finally, note that if a creditor enables the business to be
continued in return for a charge over the company's assets and the
123 Ibid., 486.
124 Ibid.
125 That is, the excess in the ®rm's value, had its resources been applied to U2, over the value of
the ®rm with its resources sunk in U1.
126 Ibid., 487.
127 Because it punishes directors for their acts or omissions by making them personally liable for
the resulting harm to creditors.
128 Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd. (No. 2) [1989] 5 B.C.C. 569, 597.
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directors continue to ward o liquidation, the amount they are
eventually ordered to contribute would be immune from any claim
the secured creditor might later make.
129 The result is to focus the
loss on those making the inecient decision to continue, and to
direct the recoveries towards those who would otherwise lose out
because of that decision. As has been mentioned above,
130 the
secured creditor can eectively monitor assets subject to the charge,
and is unlikely to be taken by surprise when the ®rm becomes
seriously distressed. Directors are unlikely to be able to substitute
assets which form part of the collateral without the secured
creditor's consent, and in many cases, they would be unable to
continue the troubled business without his collusion. The eect of
the Re Oasis decision is to ensure the secured debt is not insured,
beyond the value of the collateral, by the personal assets of
directors. To hold otherwise would have been to reward secured
creditors either for inecient monitoring or for collusion with
errant directors.
C. The haste eect
Does section 214 encourage liquidation of ecient but troubled
®rms? The costs result from the loss of going concern value,
131
because the ®rm's assets are more valuable together than if they
were split up and sold piecemeal. As a preliminary point, it must
be emphasised that the obligation to take ``every step'' the directors
ought to take to minimise loss to creditors should enable directors
subsequently challenged under section 214 to show that
continuation of the business was in fact in the creditors' interests at
the time that they concluded there was no reasonable prospect of
avoiding insolvent liquidation. This view can only gain support
from the fact that, when enacting the section, Parliament rejected
an attempt to de®ne the obligation with reference to the incurring
of further debts or other liabilities, and the word ``trading'' was
omitted from its formulation.
132 In fact, then, the immediate
shutting down of the business, while presumably avoiding any
further (variable) costs, would not prevent the directors being held
liable under the section. By the same token, it should in
appropriate circumstances be a good defence that the ®rm was kept
trading, even though this adds to its liabilities: ``If directors
reasonably believe that creditors may fare worse in a premature
forced sale of assets, and that this combined with the cost of
129 Re Oasis [1998] Ch. 170, 181G.
130 Section IV, above.
131 White labels these as Type-II costs; ibid., at 489.
132 Sealy and Milman, Annotated Guide to the 1986 Insolvency Legislation (Bicester, 1987), 223.
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liquidation proceedings may well be disastrous from unsecured
creditors' point of view, the directors' duty under section 214 may
well include a duty to attempt a company rescue or to stay at the
helm.''
133
But the concern about over-hasty liquidation becomes important
against the background thatÐat least in the early days of the
wrongful trading provisionsÐdirectors were repeatedly urged to
seek a winding up or administration order, or to invite the
appointment of a receiver, in order to avoid a section 214 order
against them.
134 Against that background, fears were expressed that
``[t]here is a clear risk that this may now seem the safest course for
directors, faced as they are with the threat of personal liability and
possible disquali®cation, even when in their own business judgment
there is a good case for carrying on''.
135
Note that if the costs of acquiring and transmitting information
about the ®rm's business prospects, and of transferring its assets
from an inecient management (or use) to a more ecient one, are
low, the going concern value would not be lost. The liquidator or
administrative receiver
136 would be able to dispose of the business
as a unit, and the new management would decide to keep it
running as such.
137 In such a situation, section 214 does not create
unnecessary costs even if directors interpret their obligations under
it so as to give undue emphasis to the appointment of outside
managers.
But suppose information and other transaction costs are high.
In this case, the liquidator might ®nd it dicult to dispose of the
business as a going concern because potential buyers are not
informed enough to arrive at the correct conclusion that it would
pay to keep the business together. Or the reason might be the
diculties inherent in ``assembling a suitable group of investors to
be risk bearers'' of an extensive and costly undertaking.
138 Perhaps
most troublesome is the absence of any ``stay'' on the right of
secured creditors to seize the collateral once the winding-up order is
handed down.
139 This is regardless of whether adequate protection
could be guaranteed, ensuring they would not be worse o with the
133 Finch, ``Directors' duties: insolvency and the unsecured creditor'', in Clarke (ed.), Current
Issues in Insolvency Law (London, 1991), 96.
134 See again e.g. A Revised Framework for Insolvency Law (Cmnd 9175, 1984), above, para. 12;
Goode, Insolvency, 472±473.
135 Sealy and Milman, above, 224.
136 The latter relying in part on IA, s. 43, which empowers the court to authorise disposal of
property subject to a prior charge.
137 White, ``Costs'', 490.
138 Aghion et al., ``Bankruptcy reform'', 528±9.
139 See again e.g. Re David Lloyd & Co. (1887) 6 Ch. D. 339, 344±345, per James L.J.
366 The Cambridge Law Journal [2000]http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 12 Sep 2012 IP address: 144.82.107.39
subject assets remaining part of the going concern than they would
be if allowed to remove them for an independent sale.
140
Be that as it may, it is to be noted that these costs arise because
of the misguided elevation of the appointment of outside
management as a panacea to all section 214-related problems and
the absence of a stay on secured creditors. Even in this limited
situation where section 214 might create perverse incentives,
though, it is dicult to see how its redistributive nature is to
blame. Recall that the perverse incentive to hasten the company
into the insolvency forum is supposed to arise because the
claimants in whose favour the redistribution is carried out would
want to capture the advantages available only in that forum.
141
Under section 214, the ®rm's unsecured creditors bene®t from the
redistributive nature of these provisions. But the quantum of the
bene®t they receive under the insolvency regime is determined by
reference to the loss that is attributable to the actions or omissions
of the management once insolvent liquidation becomes inevitable.
So if the ®rm's managers delay the inevitable, or otherwise fail to
respond appropriately, any additional loss to unsecured creditors
would be recovered from them. But if one or more of the
unsecured creditors unduly hasten the ®rm's demise, then it would
be easy for directors to show they took every step they ought to
have takenÐincluding taking steps to oppose the winding up
petitionÐto minimise loss to creditors.
VI. CONCLUSION
The analysis in this paper has operated on two levels. First, this
paper has shown that the wrongful trading provisions would be
voluntarily accepted by the shareholders and managers of the
archetypal ®rm negotiating ex ante with its creditors as being in
their own best interest. Creditors, shareholders, and managers alike
anticipate the incentives of managers to misbehave towards
creditors when the ®rm is on the brink of insolvent liquidation, and
the associated costs are passed on by creditors to shareholders, who
in turn would pass it on to managers. A provision like section 214
bonds managers to creditors when the ®rm is terminally distressed,
and thus signals the credit and labour markets not to penalise
shareholders and managers. Of course where a market solution is
availableÐas it is in the shape of the discipline imposed by the
market for managerial labour, and the existence of securityÐthe
140 This exaggerated deference to the property rights of security-holders is dicult to justify: see
Clarke, ``Security interests as property''.
141 See Section I, above.
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section 214 bond takes the back seat. This paper has suggested that
wrongful trading claims would generally be brought against
shareholder-managers of closely-held companies, and shadow
directors, and has examined ``impressionistic'' evidence which agrees
with this hypothesis. It has also been shown that the Court of
Appeal's decision in Re Oasis, directing section 214 recoveries away
from secured creditors, is perfectly reasonable as a matter of
economic eciency.
On another level, the well-established law and economics
propositionÐthat to redistribute in insolvency leads to perverse
incentivesÐhas been put to the test within the law and economics
framework. It has been argued that the wrongful trading provisions
are redistributive. They strip away the bene®t of limited liability
from the insolvent company's directors, making their assets
vulnerable to a claim by the liquidator on behalf of the company's
unsecured creditors. This takes place only within the specialised
insolvency forum, and only because the distinct insolvency regime
creates new rights and liabilities which are incapable of existing
while the company is still solvent. Three types of perverse incentive
which might potentially lead to socially inecient results are
described. The analysis has suggested that, far from creating
perverse incentives, section 214 in fact encourages directors of
troubled and healthy companies alike to operate with some much-
needed regard for the company's unsecured creditors.
One way to respond to this analysis would be to argue that the
wrongful trading provisions are exceptional in not being inecient
despite being redistributive. It might be suggested that ``the
question of relative mismatch [between the value of pre- and post-
insolvency rights] may not be decisive.''
142 One must focus also ``on
the incentives to misuse bankruptcy created by one rule or the
other.''
143 It is only if a change in the value of rights creates
incentives to use the insolvency regime strategically that the change
should be condemned. But this response gives the game away. The
position then taken amounts to saying that insolvency
redistribution creates perverse incentives, but only where it creates
perverse incentives! It is tentatively suggested here that, using
Occam's Razor, the objection to the redistribution of rights per se
can be cut out altogether. A provision, like section 214 of the
Insolvency Act, may or may not encourage strategic misuse of the
insolvency regime, but its redistributive nature is only one relevant
factor to be taken into account, and by no means is it decisive. The
142 Jackson, Bankruptcy, 74.
143 Ibid., commenting on McCoid, ``Bankruptcy, the avoiding powers, and unperfected security
interests'', (1985) 59 Am. Bankr. L.J. 175.
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dogmatic opposition to any alteration of the relative values of
parties' rights can be dropped. If this cautious suggestion is
accepted, then the law and economics approach can free itself of a
self-imposed shackle in dealing with insolvency issues.
A better response would be to concede that the wrongful
trading provisions are redistributive. They create new rights and
liabilities, and upset the relative values of pre-insolvency rights. But
this redistribution still serves maximisation goals. The redistribution
is principled, focusing on minimising further loss once the ®rm
enters the insolvency forum, and the quantum of the new rights
created is determined with reference to this aim. The section quite
clearly preserves and maximises the pool of assets with which the
®rm enters that forum. It therefore serves the primary goal of
insolvency law. It also encourages a smooth transition from the
individual pre-insolvency to the collective post-insolvency regime by
creating a counter-weight to the value-destroying incentives which
otherwise come into existence (unjusti®ed delay in initiating
insolvency proceedings is penalised, for example). The wrongful
trading provisions also therefore serve the collectivisation goal.
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